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Preslar v. Commissioner:
Debt-Discharge Income and Its Rationale
I. INTRODUCTION
How taxpayers determine the amount of money on which they
must pay taxes is an uneasy question because this amount, gross income, has never been conclusively defined. Neither the Internal
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.” or “Code”) nor the courts have ever exactly defined the concept,1 largely because the inquiry into what constitutes gross income involves numerous conceptual uncertainties.
One of these uncertainties revolves around “[i]ncome from discharge
of indebtedness.”2 The general notion of debt-discharge income
(that a taxpayer recognizes a benefit and, therefore, must recognize
income when a debt is forgiven because the taxpayer will not have to
repay the debt) is relatively uncontroversial. However, there is considerable difficulty surrounding both the actual reasoning behind the
rule and, more specifically, an exception to the rule that allows noninclusion if the original amount of the debt is uncertain.
In the case of Preslar v. Commissioner, the Tenth Circuit examined this “disputed debt” exception in depth and came to a conclusion directly at odds with preexisting Third Circuit authority.3 This
Note analyzes these opposing conclusions and ultimately suggests
that this split arises because the two circuits interpret the underlying
logic of debt discharge income differently. Part II more thoroughly
introduces the concept of debt-discharge income and examines the
disputed debt exception to the general rule. Part III examines the
facts of the Preslar case and summarizes the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning in the context of how the
rationale for debt-discharge income should affect the disputed debt
exception and critiques the Tenth Circuit’s application of the exception to the facts of the Preslar case. Finally, Part V concludes that the
Preslar court correctly analyzed the concepts of debt-discharge in1. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994); United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.
1968); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
2. § 61(a)(12).
3. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999).
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come and the disputed debt exception but incorrectly applied those
concepts to the facts of the Preslar case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Gross Income
When Great Britain first considered the adoption of an income
tax, economists differed as to what amount should constitute a tax
base.4 Based on the ideal that people should be taxed according to
their standard of living, some favored taxing personal consumption.5
Others thought that people should be taxed according to their ability to pay and favored taxing wealth.6 For a variety of reasons, an income tax was seen as a good way to attain both of these goals.7
Still, “income” had to be defined. The “Schanz-Haig-Simons”
theory attempts to do this.8 Although the theory does not explicitly
appear anywhere in the I.R.C., this concept roughly describes the tax
system’s view of gross income.9 In essence, it asserts that “an individual’s income for a given period (usually a year) equals any net increase in her wealth (or minus any net decrease in her wealth) plus
the market value of her consumption during the year.”10 Though the
concepts of consumption and wealth change may seem easily comprehensible, both can be quite difficult to accurately ascertain. For
example, consumption literally means any type of satisfaction,
whether psychological or material; under this strict interpretation, a
taxpayer’s gross income should include both tangible and intangible
benefits including, for instance, the enjoyment he receives from listening to birds sing.11 Clearly, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

4. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE,
30 (2d ed. 1999).
5. See id. at 30–31.
6. See id. at 31.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id. The federal income tax system gets to this amount, more or less, by including all
current year receipts less any business and investment deductions. Because the nondeductible
receipts must either be consumed or saved, this approach carries out the Schanz-Haig-Simons
concept. See id. at 34–35.
11. See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the
Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L. REV. 215, 224 (1990).
AND POLICY
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could not feasibly administer this interpretation. Instead, the IRS has
chosen to value consumption objectively by only assessing a tax on
the amount the taxpayer initially pays for consumption.12 This practice helps, in large part, to simplify the tax system, and the conceptual tax base may again seem simple to compute. However, taxpayers
engage in so many varied transactions that deciding whether a particular transaction is consumption or an increase in wealth or neither
is very difficult.
The Supreme Court touched upon these difficulties in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,13 a seminal case on the question of gross
income. In Glenshaw, the Supreme Court had to determine whether
a taxpayer who received a large award of exemplary damages had to
include this “windfall” in gross income.14 Feeling compelled to use a
“liberal construction”15 in applying the 1939 Code (the predecessor
to the current code), the Court held that the windfall must, indeed,
be included in gross income.16 In so holding, the Court implicitly
overruled an earlier, narrower interpretation of gross income in favor
of this inclusive catch-all definition of “all gains except those specifically exempted.”17
Understanding that the Court has approached the difficulties of
defining gross income with a wide mandate of inclusion is important
because it colors how courts look at all aspects of the system. With
such broad ideals as consumption and wealth, many questions can
and do arise, and the courts have great leeway in interpreting and
deciding these questions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Glenshaw
had an umbrella effect over every ambiguous aspect of the system,
12. See id. at 225. The IRS accomplishes this, not by determining what everyone paid
for everything, but by not allowing taxpayers to deduct from their gross income these types of
expenses. For example, assume Jack makes $10,000 a year. He has business expenses totaling
$1000. He has personal expenses totaling $5000 (spent on all the things people buy for their
personal lives). The IRS does not require Jack to keep track of every personal expense so that
they know how much to tax him (clearly, an administratively daunting task); instead the IRS
requires Jack to include all $10,000 of his income, then allows deductions only for business
expenses. Personal expenses are treated as a matter of nondeduction. See DODGE ET AL., supra
note 4, at 53–54.
13. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
14. See id. at 427, 429.
15. Id. at 430.
16. See id. at 429 (“This Court has frequently stated that. . .[the language defining gross
income] was used by Congress to exert . . . ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” (quoting
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940))).
17. Id. at 430; see also DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 62.
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instructing the courts to broadly enforce the tax code, instead of narrowly interpreting it.18
B. Debt-Discharge Income
Even before the Court adopted Glenshaw’s broad approach, it
decided that taxpayers must include the amount of a discharged debt
in gross income.19 In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., the Supreme Court held that if a “‘corporation purchases and retires
any . . . bonds at a price less than the issuing price or face value, the
excess of the issuing price . . . over the purchase price is . . . income
for the taxable year.’”20 The Court apparently limited the scope of its
holding by stating that Kirby Lumber Company had to include the
amount of reduced debt in its gross income because the reduction of
debt had “made available . . . assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct.”21 This language suggested that debtdischarge income had to be included only “to the extent that it freed
the borrower’s assets.”22
This “freed assets” justification for debt-discharge income seems
rather intuitive. At the beginning of the transaction, loan proceeds
were encumbered and did not realistically belong to the taxpayer; as
such, he did not have to include them in gross income.23 In hindsight, after the debt discharge, the loan proceeds are free and clear,

18. In Glenshaw, the Court recognized that Congress had “applied no limitations as to
the source of taxable receipts.” 348 U.S. at 429. As such, the Court felt compelled to recognize congressional intent and give wide latitude as to what items should be included in gross
income. See id. at 430.
19. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). At the time of Kirby,
before Glenshaw, the Court did construe debt-discharge income a bit more narrowly than they
now do. The Court cited an earlier case, Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170
(1926), for the proposition that a transaction could yield debt-discharge income only if the
whole transaction was not a loss. Kerbaugh-Empire, however, has been largely discredited and
a transaction can now yield debt-discharge income even though the transaction as a whole
yielded a loss. See William Helburn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815, 819 (1st Cir. 1954)
(stating that Kerbaugh-Empire is a “frequently criticized . . . decision.”); DODGE ET AL., supra
note 4, at 137 (“[T]he taxpayer [is not] asked (as suggested by the Kerbaugh Empire case. . .)
if the borrowed money is still wholly ‘intact . . . .’”).
20. 284 U.S. at 3 (quoting Article 545(1)(c) of Regulations 62, under Revenue Act of
1921).
21. Id.
22. Gregory M. Giangiordano, Taxation—Discharge of Indebtedness Income—Zarin v.
Commissioner, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1991).
23. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 133.
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and the taxpayer can do anything he wants with them. It seems clear
that he should now include the “newly acquired assets” in his gross
income.
The Supreme Court, though, in Commissioner v. Tufts, seemed
to move away from the freed assets justification.24 In Tufts, the taxpayer owned property that was subject to a nonrecourse mortgage
(an obligation for which he was not personally liable).25 The taxpayer
transferred the property to a buyer, and the buyer assumed the nonrecourse debt.26 The Court held that the taxpayer realized income
equal to the amount of the discharged mortgage.27 The Court did
not look at whether the discharge freed any of the taxpayer’s assets;
instead, it focused on the symmetry28 of the loan transaction.29 The
Court reasoned that the taxpayer did not have to pay taxes on the
original loan because the government assumed that he would eventually repay the debt using after-tax dollars.30 The Court further reasoned that, if the government’s prediction proved incorrect (the taxpayer ended up not repaying the obligation), the taxpayer would
have “effectively . . . received untaxed income at the time the loan
was extended.”31 So, when it becomes clear that a taxpayer is not going to repay the debt (in other words, when it becomes clear that the
taxpayer received untaxed income), the IRS is allowed to remedy this
error by taxing the amount of unpaid debt as income. It does not
matter whether the taxpayer discharged a recourse mortgage or a
nonrecourse mortgage (an action that would not free up assets because the taxpayer was never personally liable for the debt); what
matters is that the IRS’s treatment of the back end of the transaction
should be consistent with its treatment of the front end of the transaction.

24. See 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Shaviro, supra note 11, at 218.
25. See 461 U.S. at 302.
26. See id. at 303.
27. See id. at 308–09. The decision is more complicated than just that: income is not
wholly defined by the amount of the mortgage discharge, and the case also deals with issues
concerning how the income is recognized. For our purposes, though, the case stands for the
proposition that discharge of nonrecourse debt can result in income to the taxpayer. See
DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 168–70.
28. See infra Part IV.A.2.
29. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309–10.
30. See id. at 307.
31. Id. at 310.
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Tufts changed the rationale for debt-discharge income. No
longer is a debt discharge included in income only when it frees assets. Under Tufts, all debt discharge becomes income when the debt
was originally excluded from income. This shift does not destroy the
concept of the disputed debt exception. However, it does change the
basis for the concept, and that change has a very real effect on the
application of the rule and its exceptions.
C. The Disputed-Debt Exception
In N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, the United States Board of Tax
Appeals created an exception to the concept of debt-discharge income.32 In Sobel, a corporation bought one hundred shares of stock
from its bank with a note of credit.33 When the note came due, the
corporation refused to pay and brought suit, demanding rescission of
the note and judgment for the interest paid.34 The corporation
claimed that the transaction was illegal and that the bank had failed
to live up to its duties; the parties settled for half the original amount
of the note.35 The IRS contended that the corporation had to include the half that had been settled away in its gross income.36 The
court held that, since there was “question . . . as to . . . [the taxpayer’s] liability and the amount thereof,” the IRS could not definitively say that the discharge had actually freed any of the taxpayer’s
assets.37 In other words, until the settlement, the debt “was not actual and present by any practical test.”38 Since the amount of debt
was unknown, the taxpayer could not be taxed on a forgiveness of it.
Under the freeing of assets test, a debt is sufficiently “in dispute”
if it is either unenforceable or unliquidated (the actual amount of the
original debt is unknown). After all, one cannot free an already-freed
asset—if the debt was always unenforceable, the asset was always free.

32. See 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939). Though this case was decided before the Supreme Court adopted the symmetry rationale, the exception survives today. See Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990). However, it is my contention that the shift in rationale for the inclusion of debt-discharge income should be accompanied by a shift in the
rationale and, hence, the application of the disputed debt exception.
33. See 40 B.T.A. at 1264.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 1265.
38. Id.
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The Third Circuit, in Zarin v. Commissioner, applied the freeing of
assets test to an unenforceable debt.39 In this case, Zarin had run up
considerable debt to a casino; under state law, however, the debt was
unenforceable.40 The casino and Zarin eventually settled their debt
out of court for an amount considerably lower than what Zarin actually owed.41 The IRS contended that this represented debt-discharge
income. Zarin claimed that, because he disputed the debt, the disputed-debt exception applied and he did not have to include the discharged amount in gross income. The IRS countered that the exception applied only to an unliquidated debt.42 The Third Circuit
explicitly rejected the IRS’s position and held that, “[w]hen a debt is
unenforceable, it follows that the amount of the debt, and not just
the liability thereon, is in dispute.”43
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Preslar created a split on this
point.44 In Preslar, the Tenth Circuit rejected Zarin and stated that
“[t]o implicate the [disputed debt] . . . doctrine, the original amount
of the debt must be unliquidated.”45 Thus, the Third Circuit will invoke the disputed-debt exception when the original debt is either
unenforceable or unliquidated, and the Tenth Circuit will invoke the
exception only when the original amount is unliquidated.
III. PRESLAR V. COMMISSIONER
A. Facts
In 1983, Layne Preslar and his wife, Sue, purchased a 2500 acre
ranch near Cloudcroft, New Mexico for one million dollars.46 The
Preslars financed the entire amount by executing a promissory note,
secured by a mortgage on the ranch, in favor of Moncor Bank.47 The
Preslars intended to develop part of the ranch by subdividing 160
acres and selling one- or two-acre lots; the rest of the land was to be

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See 916 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1990).
See id. at 112.
See id.
See id. at 116.
Id.
See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id.
See id. at 1325.
See id.
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for hunting and other outdoor activities.48 The plan enjoyed some
success, and the bank allowed the Preslars to pay their note installments by assigning the sales contracts from lot purchasers to Moncor
Bank at a discount.49
In August 1985, Moncor Bank was declared insolvent, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) was appointed receiver and took over the bank’s operations.50 The FDIC refused to
accept the assignment of sales contracts as payment on the Preslars’
note and ordered the Preslars to stop selling lots.51 The Preslars sued,
claiming that the FDIC breached their contract. The parties settled
out of court, with the FDIC agreeing to accept $350,000 in full satisfaction for the Preslars’ debt.52 This represented a $449,463 reduction of the Preslars’ outstanding debt; they did not include this
amount in their gross income.53 The IRS audited the Preslars and determined that they had underreported their gross income by not including the amount of the discharged debt.54
The Preslars took their case to the United States Tax Court,
claiming that they were exempt from including the amount in their
gross income by 26 U.S.C. § 108(e)(5) (1994).55 The Tax Court ignored the Preslars’ section 108 claim but ruled in their favor by invoking, sua sponte, the disputed debt exception.56 It held that the
amount of the Preslars’ debt was not firmly established until the settlement actually occurred; hence, they did not have any debtdischarge income.57 The IRS appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.58 The Tenth Circuit overturned the Tax Court, holding
that the Preslars did have to include the debt-discharge amount in

48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1325–26.
52. See id. at 1326.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. Pursuant to § 108(e)(5), under certain circumstances a seller’s reduction of a
buyer’s outstanding debt may be exempted from debt discharge income treatment. Though
this section is an important caveat to the general rules of debt discharge income, it ultimately
has no real bearing on this case or this note.
56. See id at 1326.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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their gross income because the disputed-debt exception could not be
applied to a liquidated debt.59
B. Reasoning
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the IRS and found that the
amount of the Preslars’ debt discharge fell within the definition of
gross income and, more specifically, within the scope of 26 U.S.C.
§ 61(a)(12).60 The court then discussed both the free assets and symmetry rationales for the debt-discharge income rule. The court cited
the Supreme Court case of Commissioner v. Tufts 61 and, without explicitly saying so, adopted the symmetry justification.62
Moving to an analysis of the disputed-debt exception, the court
stated that the exception “rests on the premise that if a taxpayer diputes the original amount of a debt . . . , a subsequent settlement of
that dispute is ‘treated as the amount of debt cognizable for tax purposes.’”63 The court also examined the seminal case of N. Sobel, Inc.
v. Commissioner.64 It construed Sobel as allowing for nonrecognition
because in that case the “corporation’s financial obligations could
not be assessed . . . [because] the existence and amount were not
fixed until the date of settlement.”65 This interpretation seems to require that the amount be unliquidated.
The court then looked at Zarin and baldly stated that the Third
Circuit incorrectly found that an unenforceable debt is unliquidated.66 The Tenth Circuit held that treating liquidated and unliquidated debts alike is incorrect because “[t]he whole theory behind requiring that the amount of a debt be disputed before the contested
liability exception can be triggered is that only in the context of disputed debts is the . . . [IRS] unaware of the exact consideration ini-

59. See id. at 1328.
60. See id. at 1333.
61. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
62. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1327–29.
63. Id. at 1327 (quoting Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Undoubtedly, the Third Circuit would feel that relying on Zarin for this proposition was, at
least, disingenuous. The Tenth Circuit took a small quote out of context to support a proposition that Zarin explicitly rejects. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
64. See 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939).
65. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328 (emphasis added).
66. See id.
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tially exchanged in a transaction.”67 The court’s sole authority for
this specific rationale was a single law review article.68 The article, in
turn, relied on nothing; it suggested, in and of itself, that a taxpayer
can utilize the disputed debt exception only when the IRS does not
know the amount of debt initially excluded from gross income. In
other words, this is merely an administrative requirement meant to
allow the IRS to simplify its auditing processes so that it does not
have to investigate every unliquidated debt.69 It seems that the court
was, on its own, creating a new justification for the debt-discharge
rule.
However, the court immediately solidified its position by also
adopting the established symmetry rationale. The court stated that,
“‘[i]f the parties initially treated the transaction as a loan when the
proceeds were received, thereby not declaring the receipt as income,
then the transaction should be treated consistently when the loan is
discharged and income should be declared in the amount of the discharge.’”70 The court, somewhat secondarily, added that this symmetry rationale is “underscored” by Tufts because the Supreme Court
found that if “indebtedness is treated as a true debt when . . . incurred, it must be treated as a true debt when . . . discharged.”71 The
court further reasoned that “if the distinction between the recourse
and nonrecourse nature of a loan has no bearing on calculation of
gross income, the enforceability of a debt should be of equally
minimal importance.”72 The court seemed to minimize this justification; however, since this is the only place where the court solidly relied on any precedent; this was really the heart of the court’s reasoning.
67. Id.
68. See id. (relying on Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256).
69. See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256. This is not to suggest that the IRS cannot, or
should not, make rules based on administrative decisions. See Haverly v. United States, 513
F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that “[i]t is not for the courts to quarrel with. . .[the
IRS’s] rational allocation of its administrative resources”). This is merely pointing out that the
Tenth Circuit, so cavalier in shooting down its sister circuit, is here apparently relying not on
established precedent or authority but merely on a proposed justification from a law review
article.
70. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1200 n.88).
The court also relied on Glenshaw for this proposition by stating that any other interpretation
(i.e., the free assets rationale) would “disavow the Supreme Court’s mandate that the phrase
‘gross income’ be interpreted as broadly as the Constitution permits.” Id.
71. Id. (relying on Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 311–13 (1983)).
72. Id.
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The court went on to undercut Zarin’s reliance on one of the
Tenth Circuit’s cases. Zarin relied on United States v. Hall, a gambling debt case remarkably similar to Zarin.73 In Hall, the Tenth
Circuit found that the taxpayer did not have income when he settled
a gambling debt for less than its “face” amount because the debt,
“being unenforceable . . . [did] not meet the requirements of debt
necessary to justify the . . . operation of general rules of tax law relating to cancellation of debt.”74 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
Hall’s emphasis on unenforceability made the case questionable in
light of Tufts, and, even if Hall were still good law, Zarin’s reliance
was misplaced because the debt in Hall was unliquidated. Even in
Hall, the symmetry rationale, not the freed assets approach, underlies the decision.
The court then moved to the specific facts of Preslar, holding
that the Tax Court had incorrectly found the amount of the Preslars’
debt unliquidated. The Tenth Circuit found no evidence to support
the Preslars’ contention that the amount of the debt was in dispute.
The court reasoned that, since there was no competent evidence
showing that the FDIC had to observe the previous creditor’s practice of accepting assignment of sales contracts as payment on their
note, there was no good faith disagreement over how much the note
was worth. The court continued that, even if there were a good faith
disagreement, the disagreement pertained only to the terms of repayment not to the actual amount of the debt. There being no evidence of a good faith dispute over the amount of the debt, the disputed-debt exception could not be invoked to surpass the debtdischarge income rule.75
IV. ANALYSIS
The Preslar court got the law right, but it came to the wrong
conclusion only because it incorrectly applied the law to the facts.
The Tenth Circuit was right about applying the disputed-debt exception because it correctly analyzed and applied the underlying debtdischarge income rule. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, was
wrong because it incorrectly construed the underlying tax law too
broadly.
73. United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962).
74. Id. at 241.
75. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1330–31.
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A. Reasoning Behind the Debt-Discharge Income Rule
Intuitively, it seems clear that taxpayers should have to include
debt-discharge in gross income. If someone were to work as a parking attendant, save up $5000 and buy a new car with the money, she
would have effectively been taxed on the consumption that the car
represents because she had to pay taxes on the $5000 when she
earned it.76 Similarly, if someone were to borrow $5000 from an offshore bank and buy a car, he would effectively have to pay taxes on
the consumption the car represents because he would have to repay
the debt with after-tax dollars. If, however, the off-shore bank were
to go bankrupt and forgive the borrower’s debt, he would have
$5000 of consumption (through the purchase of the car), but he
would have it tax-free because he would no longer have to repay the
debt with after-tax dollars. This seems unfair. The concept of debtdischarge income addresses this concern. As stated above, the reasoning behind this judicially created rule of income has changed
since its first inception.77 This change is important to the Preslar
case, and to the circuit split it recognizes, because a rule’s reasoning
should directly affect how courts construe and apply any exceptions
to that rule.
1. Freeing assets
The first justification for the debt-discharge rule, established in
Kirby Lumber, was the freeing assets construct.78 Under this approach, debt-discharge income constituted part of a taxpayer’s gross
income when a creditor discharged a debt, thereby freeing some asset of the debtor. This makes sense because, as in the above example,
we do not want some people, through sheer luck, to enjoy consumption tax-free while others pay taxes on identical consumption. This
approach feels equitable because it appears to take care of what
seems unfair: by taxing people when an asset is freed through loanforgiveness, the IRS ensures that those taxpayers do not arbitrarily
receive tax-free consumption.

76. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (1994).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 15–23.
78. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
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As previously stated, the Supreme Court created the freed assets
justification in United States v. Kirby Lumber.79 This justification,
however, arises entirely from one sentence of dicta.80 The Court
cited no cases, statutes, legislative history, or anything else for this
proposition; it seemed to rely only on the apparent fairness of the
idea. That is not to say that, because it was “only” Supreme Court
dicta, it had no effect. Indeed, until some superseding Court reasoning came along, it was the controlling rationale, and all courts should
have bound themselves to defining debt-discharge income in accordance with the Court’s stated justification. Superseding dicta did,
however, come along in Tufts.81
2. Symmetry
As already described, Tufts abandoned the freed assets approach.82 The Supreme Court did so by ignoring whether the discharge freed the taxpayer’s assets from obligations (or even the question of whether the taxpayer had economic incentive to honor the
obligation)83 and instead focusing on whether an untaxed discharge
transaction would mean that “the mortgagor effectively will have received untaxed income at the time the loan was extended.”84
This was the birth of symmetry because the Court cared only
about the debt money that was received on the front end of the
transaction; that is, the amount that needs to be taxed on the back
end of the transaction (if, of course, it is discharged). For example,
assume Jack borrows $10,000. He and his creditor reach some kind
of arrangement where Jack is personally liable for only $7000. Before

79. See id. at 1.
80. See id.
81. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
82. See supra Part II.B.
83. Previously, a nonrecourse mortgage was included in income because the Court assumed that the taxpayer would repay the debt with after-tax dollars. The logic of this assumption, though, applied only when the market value of the underlying asset exceeded the amount
of the mortgage (because only then would the taxpayer have the rational incentive to actually
pay the debt instead of allowing it to lapse and the creditor to take an asset worth more than
the debt). The Court specifically left open the question of whether the taxpayer would have to
include the discharged amount of the nonrecourse mortgage in gross income when the
amount of the debt exceeded the fair market value of the underlying property (thereby leaving
a rational seller with no incentive to repay the debt). See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1,
14 (1947); DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 158–60.
84. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310.
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the debt comes due, Jack’s creditor permanently leaves the country,
effectively discharging Jack’s debt. Under the freed assets approach,
Jack realizes $7000 of debt discharge income because it is only to
that extent that his assets were encumbered (by his personal obligation). Under the symmetry analysis, though, all that matters is the
amount that Jack initially received. The focus is on ensuring that, in
the end, Jack is taxed on the amount that he received in the beginning.
Though the factual context of Tufts may have differed from the
normal debt-discharge income scenario, the Court’s reasoning was
broad enough to encompass all debt-discharge income.85 When one
gets rid of debt, the Court simply asks whether or not the taxpayer is
receiving an unwarranted accession to wealth because the IRS did
not tax the amount in the beginning since it thought at the time that
the taxpayer was obligated to repay the debt.
One may counter that Tufts does not extend this far by claiming
that a nonrecourse mortgage is indeed enforceable to some extent.86
However, the Supreme Court, in Tufts, did not say that the seller realized gain only to the extent that the seller had some liability in the
property. On the contrary, the Court specifically held that it does
not matter whether the “amount of the nonrecourse mortgage exceeds the value of the property transferred.”87 The seller realizes
gross income to the full extent of the mortgage, no matter to what
extent it is enforceable against him. This specific reasoning, along

85. One weakness in this theory is found in footnote 11. Here, the Court stated that
“[w]e are not presented with and do not decide the contours of the cancellation-ofindebtedness doctrine. We note only that our approach does not fall within certain prior interpretations of that doctrine.” 461 U.S. at 311 n.11. This language seems to constrain the symmetry approach to the particular issue of treatment of nonrecourse debt, precluding application
to the general principle of debt-discharge income. However, this language applied to how the
competing rationales relate to the application and characterization of basis. See Rev. Rul. 9131; DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 176. Indeed, symmetry is today accepted as the sole rationale for debt discharge. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 136.
86. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323, 1336 (10th Cir. 1999) (Ebel, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only way Tufts’ holding ‘underscores’ the majority’s holding is if a nonrecourse loan is treated as the functional equivalent of an unenforceable debt.”). Judge Ebel
stated that, though a taxpayer has no personal liability on a nonrecourse mortgage, the taxpayer still has liability to the extent of the underlying security interest. He then contended that,
since there is some liability involved with a nonrecourse mortgage, Tufts is constrained to a
nonrecourse mortgage and cannot be extended to a completely unenforceable debt. See id. at
1336–37.
87. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307.
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with the Court’s rather explicit dicta,88 strongly suggests that the
Court has adopted the symmetry rationale without qualification.89
B. Debt-Discharge Income Reasoning and Its Effect on the DisputedDebt Exception
1. Application of the disputed-debt exception under the freed assets
rationale
If freeing assets is the test for whether a discharged debt is included in gross income, courts should interpret the disputed-debt
exception more broadly by extending the exception to situations
where the parties dispute the enforceability, as well as the amount, of
a debt. The exception should extend this far because such a dispute
centers around that which would make the discharged debt income:
if the debt is truly unenforceable, the debt-discharge frees no assets
and no gross income results. The taxpayer would not have to include
this discharge because the debt never encumbered any assets. So, if a
creditor were to forgive a loan, the taxpayer would not have to include the discharged amount in income if he could argue that the
loan was unenforceable.90
2. Application of the disputed-debt exception under the symmetry
rationale
Under symmetry, a court is concerned with how much benefit
the debtor originally received (the front end of the loan) rather than
how much the debt is actually worth to the debtor.91 This theory is
an administrative one; the only reason to allow the dispute to affect
88. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
89. Indeed, most today regard symmetry as the sole justification for the concept of
debt-discharge income. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 136.
90. See supra Part II.B. Just how clear unenforceability must be may depend on the
situation. As noted above, the Court found that where there was economic incentive to repay
the debt was “enforceable” enough that its discharge would free assets. Exactly how far the
Court would be willing to extend this “virtual” enforceability (i.e., moral incentive, social incentive, etc.) is unclear. What is important, though, is that under the “free assets” rationale the
Court would, at some point, allow a question about unenforceability (completely apart from
amount) to render debt discharge non-includable.
91. See Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1201; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 242–43; supra
Part II.B.
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whether the discharge is included in gross income is because, where
the parties themselves are unsure of the amount, the IRS also must
be “unaware of the exact consideration initially exchanged in a transaction.”92
At first glance, it may seem that symmetry is merely doing the
same thing that the freed assets rationale does. By allowing a taxpayer to not include a debt-discharge because the parties to the
transaction dispute the debt, the court is allowing them to determine, after the fact, what the debt is worth (or, in other words, what
assets are really being freed). However, symmetry is different because
it focuses on error-correction. The IRS taxes according to the parties’ settlement, not because it cares what the parties think the debt
is really worth (the assets they think it truly freed), but because the
settlement is the only proxy the IRS has to determine how much the
IRS had initially allowed the debtor to exclude from income.
An error-correction focus precludes the IRS from allowing deductions for disputes over enforceability. They do not care if the
debt is enforceable because that does not affect the amount initially
received and excluded. Likewise, the IRS does not really care that
the parties do not agree on the original amount of debt. This figure,
again, goes only to determining how much of the taxpayer’s asset
base the debt discharge freed.
Discharged debt, however, requires the IRS to take notice of the
amount. If the service does not know how much the taxpayer initially excluded from gross income, it cannot levy a correct tax (in the
same sense that the service, under the freed assets approach, could
not equitably assess tax if the debt were not conclusively enforceable). In this case, the IRS has made a distinct choice; it has chosen
to not get involved in the determination of the initial amount of the
debt. Instead, it allows the parties to decide for themselves (through
settlement or court process). The IRS essentially forgoes the tax
revenue because, administratively, the effort to determine the
amount of discharged debt would exceed the benefit.93
C. The Difference Between Preslar and Zarin
In Preslar, the Tenth Circuit recognized a distinct circuit split
over the treatment of liquidated debts for the purpose of the dis92. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328.
93. See Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1990).
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puted-debt exception when it stated that “[t]he problem with the
Third Circuit’s holding is it treats liquidated and unliquidated debts
alike.”94 The Third Circuit held that a debt certain as to amount and
questionable only as to legal enforceability, when settled, was excluded from gross income by the debt-discharge exception.95 The
Tenth Circuit explicitly required a debt to be unliquidated before the
exception can apply.96
At first glance, it may seem that Zarin differs from Preslar in
only a semantic way. After all, the Third Circuit, instead of explicitly
holding that a taxpayer can invoke the disputed debt exception and
exclude debt-discharge when the debt is disputed only as to amount,
stated that “[w]hen a debt is unenforceable, it follows that the
amount of the debt, and not just the liability thereon, is in dispute.”97 Seemingly, the court only said that the term “enforceability”
necessarily connotes “amount.” Similarly, the reasoning and the split
may appear based on the timing of valuation of consumption. The
Third Circuit, by allowing a liquidated debt to qualify under the exception, seemed to allow parties to decide what the value of consumption “really” was at the time of purchase.98
Neither of these rationales explains the true difference between
Zarin and Preslar.99 To understand what the Zarin court was actually doing and where the split truly comes from, one must go deeper
into the case. What Zarin did was look at the disputed-debt exception in light of the freed assets rationale. The court allowed the after-

94. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328.
95. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116.
96. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328.
97. Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116.
98. See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 223–39. This ex post facto valuation is a corrupt
method of valuing consumption. Shaviro points out that, under our current system, we assign
a cost basis to consumption. A person is taxed on his consumption based on how much he paid
for it, not his real psychic value. This reason, though perhaps not ideologically pure, is the acknowledged mode of performance for a number of reasons.
99. The court, somewhat disingenuously, made a couple of stabs at the proposition that
all it was really doing was holding that enforceability connotes amount. For example, the court
stated that “[i]f indeed the only issue was the enforceability of the entire debt, there would
have been no settlement. Zarin would have owed all or nothing.” Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116.
This concept plainly ignores, though, the fact that a purely rational person, realizing that the
debt was unenforceable, would refuse to pay the amount he originally had agreed to (assuming
he originally assumed the debt enforceable). Even if he agreed as to the amount initially acquired, he would rationally push his advantage and drive a bargain for less than the initial
amount. See Shaviro, supra, note 11, at 256.
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the-fact debt valuation because it focused on the concept of asset
worth—it wanted to know how much, in Zarin’s current assets, the
debt really represented at the time of purchase. This is what Sobel (a
case the Third Circuit heavily relied on) did; it asked how much the
original debt “really” was.100 The Third Circuit, shadowing this reasoning, searched for an answer to that question: how much was the
original debt really worth? Since acknowledging that the more one
has lost the more one has consumed seems odd and counterintuitive;101 the court refused to stop at the standard cost-based approach. It allowed the parties to assign a value after they had concluded that the debt was legally unenforceable. If the court had used
the symmetry approach it would not have concerned itself with the
actual value to the taxpayer; it would have coldly asked how much
the parties initially excluded—that is the amount that had to be included in gross income.102
That the court relied on the freed assets approach becomes still
more apparent when one looks at the reasoning of the court. The
Third Circuit drew primarily from Sobel. That case, decided before
Tufts, relied on the freed assets justification when it analyzed
whether the debt there in question qualified under the disputed-debt
exception.103 Indeed, the Third Circuit actually quoted freed assets
language from Sobel.104 Additionally, the court cited a Tenth Circuit
case, United States v. Hall, which the court construed as supporting
100. See N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939).
101. See Zarin v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
102. Admittedly, here as well, the court could focus on the value of what was initially
excluded rather than on the amount. However, it is much more detached for a court to cleanly
ask how much cost-basis did the party originally receive when that question is the end of the
analysis—that is all we are concerned with. Yet, when a court focuses on how much of the taxpayer’s asset base the discharge freed (in essence equating current assets with the value of the
debt), the court has difficulty acknowledging that the more one loses at a socially disapprovedof activity (like gambling), the more he should be taxed. See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1101 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting) (decrying “the incongruous result that the more a gambler loses, the . . .
larger the increase in his wealth”); Shaviro, supra note 11, at 235. If the Third Circuit, in Zarin, had focused on the cold reality of balancing off-setting amounts, raising taxes proportionally to a rising amount of gambling losses would not have troubled them. They certainly would
not have been so troubled that they would abandon the standard ex ante cost valuation in favor of a subjective ex post facto valuation.
103. See Zarin, 40 B.T.A. 1263.
104. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115 (“[T]he Board held that the portion of the note forgiven
by the bank ‘was not the occasion for a freeing of assets and that there was no gain . . . .’”
(quoting Zarin, 40 B.T.A. at 1265)).
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the freed assets rationale.105 In Hall, the Tenth Circuit ruled on a
gambling case “factually similar to [Zarin].”106 There, the Tenth
Circuit seemed to hold “that because the debt was unenforceable,
the amount of the loss and resulting debt cognizable for tax purposes were fixed by the settlement . . . .”107 Again, the court looked
at authority that applied the disputed-debt exception to a situation
where debt-discharge income was based upon the freed assets approach.
So, the Third Circuit looked at these two freed assets cases and
then allowed a debt, disputed only as to enforceability, to qualify
under the disputed-debt exception. However, rather than explicitly
stating that they were allowing taxpayers to except liquidated debts,
the court rejected the Commissioner’s arguments and authorities
and, with no prior authority, stated that the question of amount is
necessarily involved in the question of enforceability.108 The only explanation for this is that the court had implicitly adopted a freed assets justification but did not want to explicitly say so, in light of the
fact that Tufts had probably overruled that justification.109
Preslar, on the other hand, cleanly applied the symmetry justification to the debt-discharge exception and, as such, held that the
disputed-debt exception applies only when the amount of the debt is
unliquidated.110 In essence, the court found that the “whole theory

105. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115–16.
106. Id. at 115.
107. Id. It should not surprise the reader to know that the Tenth Circuit, in Preslar, explicitly questioned the Zarin court’s reliance on Hall. In addition to questioning Hall ’ s “continued viability . . . in light of. . . Tufts,” the court argued that the taxpayer in Hall qualified
for the disputed-debt exception because the debt was unliquidated, not because the debt was
unenforceable. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329.
108. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116.
109. Again, the reason that the freed assets justification influenced the court is not that it
forced the court to allow the parties to go back and assign a “real” value to the actual amount
of consumption; one could just as easily argue that under the symmetry justification, a court
should be interested in error-correction only as to the “real” value that was first received. If
one starts, though, by realizing: (1) that Zarin stated that unenforceability always means that
the amount of the debt is questionable and (2) that this proposition is clearly not true, one
must ask himself why Zarin makes this leap. That the court focused on the freed assets justification explains this behavior. Since this approach is more sensitive to what the initial consumption was really worth (i.e., a person would not encumber his assets unless he had some set
value in mind), the court is more willing to allow parties to go back and re-decide how much
things were worth if the transaction seems odd to the court. Also, the fact that Zarin only cited
freed assets cases suggests that this is indeed the rationale the court was implicitly adopting.
110. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328–29.
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behind requiring that the amount of a debt be disputed before the
contested liability exception can be triggered is that only in . . . [this
context is] the . . . [IRS] unaware of the exact consideration initially
exchanged in a transaction.”111 For this blunt proposition, the court
relied wholly on only one law review article.112 The proposition,
though, was “underscored by the Supreme Court’s holding in
Tufts.”113 Having adopted the symmetry justification, the court directly disallowed the disputed-debt exception to apply to the Preslar
debt because it was disputed only as to enforceability.
The circuit split really comes down to what justification the court
is using. The Third Circuit focused on the freed assets approach (going through some questionable legal and semantic gymnastics to allow an unenforceable debt to qualify). The Tenth Circuit, on the
other hand, concentrated on the symmetry justification; as such, any
debt with a liquidated amount cannot qualify for the disputed-debt
exception. So, deciding which circuit is right means deciding which
justification is right.
D. Symmetry—The Correct Rationale
The Preslar court was right because it used the correct justification for the debt-discharge concept. Though the judicial concept of
debt-discharge income started with the explicit justification of freed
assets114 and never really expressly moved to the justification of symmetry,115 this reasoning better comports with the modern judicial
concept of the broader definition of gross income.116 It also just
makes better sense.
Recall that the modern conceptualization of gross income arises
primarily from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Glenshaw.117 The
Court held that Congress, in creating the federal income tax, in-

111. Id. at 1328.
112. See Shaviro, supra note 11.
113. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329.
114. It is true that Congress later codified the disputed-debt exception at 26 U.S.C
§ 61(a)(12) (1994), but this codification did not include a rationale. Presumably, Congress
was satisfied enough with the Supreme Court’s argument in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U.S. 1 (1931) that it did not change the reasoning when creating the law.
115. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 300 n.11 (1983).
116. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
117. See supra Part II.
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tended to paint an extremely wide stroke.118 Basically, taxpayers must
include in gross income everything they receive unless a specific provision of the I.R.C. explicitly allows a deduction.119
Symmetry comports with Glenshaw better than freed assets does
because, by taking into account all debt proceeds originally received
and not initially included in gross income, it reaches more of a taxpayer’s consumption. Freed assets, on the other hand, excepts any
unenforceable debt, and “[section] 61(a) of the Code, which taxes
all accessions to wealth ‘from whatever source derived,’ clearly does
not sanction such a result.”120 The freed assets approach is, in reality,
a deduction—a deduction not explicitly laid out in the I.R.C. In addition to this, the plain fact that symmetry pulls more money into
the tax base shows that it is more in line with Glenshaw.121 Symmetry’s broad grasp of everything capable of reasonable ascertainment
fits in with this better than does the self-limiting reach of the freed
assets approach.
Glenshaw also supports symmetry in a more implicit way. Glenshaw overruled an earlier definition of income that based gross income inclusion on the source of the income.122 This earlier decision,
Eisner v. Macomber, stated that “‘[i]ncome may be defined as . . . derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,’ provided it
be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets.”123 It is clear that Glenshaw destroyed this sourcebased treatment.124 The freed assets approach is reminiscent of this
kind of treatment because it asks the source of the income—that is,
does it come from a specific type of loan (one that encumbers a person’s assets). Symmetry, by ignoring the source altogether and only
asking the amount of the debt (from whatever source), is much more
in alignment with Glenshaw’s implicit overruling of the source-based
definition of gross income of Eisner.
118. See Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 426.
119. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 41.
120. Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1200 (quoting 26 U.S.C § 61(a)(12)). The article
also relies on the Glenshaw case for this proposition.
121. See Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 429 (“[The I.R.C.] was used by Congress to exert . . .
‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” (quoting Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334
(1940))).
122. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 62.
123. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S.
399, 415 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (6th Cir. 1918)).
124. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 62.
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Preslar’s symmetry reasoning logically flows from Glenshaw. The
Glenshaw court found that Congress intended to “tax all gains except those specifically exempted.”125 The freed assets approach artificially carves out an exemption. The symmetry rationale, in contrast,
applies the exception only when it is truly necessary126—only when
the IRS does not know the actual amount of the debt. That is, the
service wants to tax everything possible, but the only reason they do
not is because they do not know the actual amount initially excluded
from gross income (not because of a contrived reason like not knowing how much of the taxpayer’s assets were actually encumbered by
the debt).127
Another indication that the symmetry approach has been
adopted is Congress’s treatment of the freed assets approach. Under
the earlier approach, debtors did not recognize income if they were
insolvent.128 This resulted in the fact that a debtor, being obligated
to include debt-discharge income only to the extent of freed assets,
was immune from recognizing income if he was insolvent. On the
other hand, if he were only minimally solvent, he had to recognize
income only to the extent that assets exceeded liabilities (since you
can only free assets that you have).129 This rationale, however, “must
have been regarded as flawed by Congress, for Congress preempted
the common-law rule by enacting § 108(b), which provides that the
insolvent debtor is . . . taxed on the debt-discharge income.”130 That
Congress felt the freed assets approach so flawed as to need legislative rectification militates in favor of enforcing a different regime—
symmetry.
Symmetry is also better in the sense that it treats all taxpayers the
same. The freed assets approach allows one taxpayer, fortunate
enough to incur unenforceable debt, to enjoy consumption tax free
125. Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 430.
126. Granted, the judiciary can carve out exceptions to laws when it deems it necessary
for a proper construction of the law. However, when choosing between two possible rationales
for an exception, it makes sense to choose that which complies with other, previous constructions of the underlying law.
127. See Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1200; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256. The
Tenth Circuit actually relied primarily on the Shaviro article for this proposition; however, even
though there was no previous explicit authority, it is a well-reasoned and persuasive approach
to prior statutory and case law.
128. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 136.
129. See id. at 135–36.
130. Id. at 136.
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(or partially tax-free), where another taxpayer will have to pay for the
identical consumption in after-tax dollars.131 This is yet another way
that the freed assets approach is incompatible with how Congress has
chosen to tax us and how the Supreme Court has chosen to interpret
tax law. Income tax laws should be interpreted broadly, giving exceptions only where they have been explicitly carved out.
E. The Right Rule the Wrong Way
The Tenth Circuit adopted the right justification for disputeddebt income. It decided to look at the debt and hold that, if it were
liquidated (enforceable or not), the Preslars would have to include
any debt-discharge amount in gross income. The court, however, incorrectly ruled that the Preslars’ debt was liquidated.
Under the Preslars’ original debt arrangement, Moncor Bank allowed them to repay their loan by assigning sales contracts to the
bank at a discount rate.132 Later, when the FDIC became receiver for
the bank, the FDIC refused to allow that method of payment on the
note.133 The Preslars claimed, and the Tax Court agreed, that the
original amount of debt had been inflated and that they had accepted this inflated amount only because the bank had agreed to the
unique arrangement of repayment.134
In other words, the Preslars claimed that the debt was unliquidated because there was a dispute over the method of repayment.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The court stated that the Preslars had
presented no “competent evidence to support their theory that their
loan obligation was linked to the repayment scheme”135 and that
“the Preslars’ underlying indebtedness remained liquidated at all
times.”136
This logic seems clear at first glance—the way a debt is paid does
not affect the actual amount of the debt. This decision, though, ignores a number of economic realities. A debt can be unliquidated,
even though the parties agree on the original amount, because the
method of repayment can affect how much the debt is actually

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1201.
See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1999).
See id.
See id. at 1329.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
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worth. Many different aspects of the method of repayment could affect the actual cash value of the debt. That the bank willingly assumed the contracts meant that they lost the time value of money;
the Preslars received credit for the payment now, whereas the bank
did not receive the cash for an extended period of time.137 Also, the
assumption of the contracts meant that the bank assumed the risk
and hassle of collecting on them—another factor that would decrease
the value of the actual assignment.
This meant that, though the parties attached a certain amount to
the initial note, the value of the debt initially received, and not included in gross income, actually depended on the method of repayment.138 This is not a startling idea, and, indeed, the Tenth Circuit
seemed to agree that this was possible when it stated that “[i]t is
conceivable that two parties could negotiate a loan transaction in
which the underlying amount of a debt is tied to the existence or
nonexistence of some post-execution event.”139 The court erred on
the side of caution and adopted too narrow a view of when a debt is
liquidated. The court should have taken into account the repayment
methods of which the parties initially conceived, methods that affect
how much the Preslars originally excluded from their gross income.140
The court’s other problem, that of evidence, is wholly misplaced.
The court went out of its way and overturned the lower court’s find137. Time value of money is an extraordinarily important aspect of finance. It is, in essence, what interest is all about: people pay interest for the right to use another’s money. Depending on a number of factors, the fact that the bank assumed the Preslars’ contracts for future money and credited their loan amount presently could have been worth hundreds of
thousands of dollars to the Preslars.
138. Though this seems similar to the ex post facto valuation that Zarin incorrectly condoned, it differs with regards to timing. The taxpayer is not going back, after the fact, and
claiming that the value of a sum-certain debt was actually less than what he actually agreed to
repay. Here, the taxpayer is claiming that the agreement initially included terms that initially
made the debt worth less. This means that the parties are actually disagreeing as to the initial
amount of the loan.
139. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329–30. Possibly, what the Tenth Circuit meant by this was
that the amount of a loan could be tied to a subsequent event when the exact amount of the
original debt is not expressly specified. For example, John owes one-half of what his mother
leaves him upon her death (his mother is still alive). However, these words are also susceptible
to the interpretation that the value of the amount of the debt, though the amount is specifically set, can vary according to how the method of repayment plays out (i.e., how successful
the Preslars are in selling contracts to assign to the bank).
140. This makes sense if one supposes that the Preslars would not have agreed initially to
assume one million dollars of debt had not the special method of repayment existed.
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ing as to the evidence.141 Though it adopted the correct mode of
analysis, it fed that analysis with incorrect facts by disallowing the
lower court’s findings in favor of its own. As the dissent correctly
pointed out, “the majority overlook[ed] significant evidence in the
record as well as the high standard of clear error for overturning the
[lower court’s] factual finding.”142 The Tenth Circuit should have
found that the method of payment can affect the amount of the
debt; that, as such, a dispute as to method can be a dispute as to
amount; and that, following the Tax Court’s factual findings, the
Preslars had a legitimate dispute as to method and, hence, amount.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Preslar court correctly disagreed with the
Third Circuit’s holding in Zarin and held that the disputed-debt exception applies only to debts with unliquidated amounts. The court
did so because it recognized that the rationale for debt-discharge income has changed since its first inception. Because this rationale has
changed from freed assets to symmetry, a debt-discharge should not
be excluded from gross income when it is disputed only as to enforceability. The only reason to exclude is that the parties dispute the
amount of the debt and it cannot be known for certain; hence, the
IRS does not know how much was initially excluded from gross income.143
However, having adopted the correct rationale and exception
construction, the court promptly misapplied it. The court incorrectly
held that the method of repayment did not affect the initial amount
of the loan and that, even if it did, there was no evidence in this case
that their loan was linked to a unique repayment method. The court
should have recognized that the method of repayment can indeed
affect the initial value of a loan. The court also should have respected
the lower court’s finding that, in this case, the parties did indeed dis-

141. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1330.
142. Id. at 1334 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (relying on 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (1994) and
Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002 (10th Cir. 1994)).
143. This conclusion should not be over-emphasized to completely crowd out the significance of unenforceability. It is clearly conceivable that the unenforceability of a debt could cast
legitimate doubt on the true amount of the debt. If the unenforceability of the debt makes a
court believe that the parties never really agreed on a set amount, the disputed debt exception
should apply. The point of this Note is that when the parties dispute only the enforceability,
the amount being completely clear, the disputed debt exception should not apply.
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agree, in good faith, over the method. In sum, the court incorrectly
applied the correct doctrine and came to an incorrect conclusion.
Chad J. Pomeroy
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